Power Through Knowledge

OPINIONS, SECURITY - 06/11/2022. Author: Prodromos Peios

By Stavros Lafatzi

From ancient times until today, every civilization has faced the necessity to defend itself for survival against its enemies. In the modern era, where having a decisive role on the geopolitical and geostrategic chessboard, as well as in energy-related matters, is crucial, military missions and operations become imperative, guided by the national strategic compass. Yet, from time to time, we witness significant military upsets on the battlefield. Small military units, with fewer surface units (ships) and aircraft, can immobilize an opponent with greater numbers of armored vehicles, fighters, and naval forces.

Let’s start from the beginning. Suppose the strategy of either the enemy or the defending side takes into account the geomorphology of the terrain, the season (summer or winter), and, consequently, the weather conditions. Regarding land operations, if an area has agricultural activity—take, for example, rice cultivation in the Evros region, specifically in Eastern Thrace, where there is a vast plain of rice fields—this becomes strategically significant.

What does this mean? Rice fields are permanently flooded, with water levels not falling below half a meter. Imagine a squadron of Leo 2A4 or Altay tanks crossing this area—they would simply become perfect targets for the artillery of the IV Army Corps.

Γεωγραφία Νομού Έβρου.

Picture Eastern Thrace as an immense swamp. In other words, any enemy troop movement would be impossible. Assuming all the above is taken into account, we can conclude that a militarily “weaker” country, in terms of numbers, can still strike critical enemy points and then immobilize the opponent. In ancient Greece, there was a phrase, “os tapanth’ora”—meaning “I see everything”—by the ancient Greek poet Menander. Similarly, troops must “see everything” and fully understand both their own forces and the enemy’s. Intelligence services must proactively monitor enemy troop movements and maneuvers, because whoever holds the information first will prevail. Whichever army learns first where the enemy is and what it intends to do will achieve victory regardless of military size or national strength. From a corporal radio operator to top intelligence agencies, rapid reaction and information transfer must exist.

It is worth noting that during World War II, the Nazis employed an advanced encryption system called “Enigma,” making intelligence and communications espionage particularly challenging.

Kriegsmarine (Naval) Enigma — M4

Today, the doctrine in tactical warfare has changed; mass deployments of armored vehicles, fighters, and infantry units are no longer the standard. This shift is largely due to technological advancements. For instance, a squadron of 12 fighters can now, using modern technology, cripple an entire country with strategic strikes on airports, energy infrastructure, and naval bases—provided they can carry strategic missiles like SCALP-EG, JSOW, or anti-ship missiles such as Exocet/Harpoon, capabilities that the Air Force possesses.

Is this enough? Of course not. Recent history has taught us that another crucial factor of power and deterrence must be present. If a country wants to truly be considered a state, it must recognize the critical role of its intelligence services. It was a major failure for a NATO member state to neglect the role of its secret services, as was painfully evident in 1996 at Imia (and beyond).

AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapon [JSOW]

Let’s go back to basics. Currently, the Hellenic Intelligence Service (EYP) staff consists of 80% police officers and only 20% (at best) military personnel, which initially focuses the agency more on counter-terrorism than on strategic espionage and counterintelligence. This staffing shift began in the late 1980s and continued slowly into the 1990s, and one hopes it will not cost the country in terms of territorial loss or national sovereignty. National security and the proper functioning of intelligence services is a “high-stakes sport” that political opposition leaders cannot afford to treat lightly. Attempting to exploit intelligence services for political gain, such as calling investigative committees for political theater, undermines the very effectiveness of these services.